Software transparency has become a critical component of modern cybersecurity. No longer can security teams afford to treat it as a mere compliance exercise; today, understanding exactly what is running inside an application is an operational necessity. This is where the Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) comes in – providing a structured representation of the components and dependencies that enable software to function.
Allan Friedman, cybersecurity policy expert and key player in early government and industry work around SBOM, emphasizes that producing an SBOM is not the end goal itself. Rather, it’s what organizations and their suppliers can do with this information that truly matters. An accurate SBOM becomes essential for swift response during widespread supply chain events, such as a Log4j-style vulnerability or a malicious update.
When organizations face these types of incidents, having an up-to-date SBOM allows them to determine exposure more quickly than if they had to reconstruct dependencies from scratch. This capability is crucial because suppliers that understand the components within their products can pinpoint vulnerabilities faster than those forced to react after the fact. For customers, this translates into dramatically shortened response times.
However, the ultimate objective should be deeper integration of SBOM information. Friedman suggests that SBOM data needs to become another source of enterprise security data, feeding vulnerability management, asset management, procurement, and continuous risk management processes. This is significant because attackers are not limited to vulnerabilities associated with the name of the software vendor; a smaller vendor’s application may contain outdated frameworks or libraries with known weaknesses.
This increased visibility also raises another challenge: more alerts. Finding vulnerable components within an application doesn’t necessarily mean those vulnerabilities are exploitable in that specific implementation. Here, the Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange (VEX) comes into play – a machine-processable method for communicating whether a vulnerability actually affects a product. VEX provides context to distinguish between present vulnerabilities and exploitable conditions.
In environments where security teams have more vulnerability information than resources to investigate manually – what Friedman jokingly calls the “vulnerpocalypse” – combining SBOM with VEX can lead to better prioritization rather than simply more data. However, this is not without its challenges; AI makes the transparency problem even more complicated.
As organizations increasingly embed machine learning, generative AI, and autonomous agents into applications, traditional software inventories become less relevant. This emergence of AI-powered applications introduces new complexities in terms of component tracking and vulnerability management. The next evolution of SBOMs – AI BOMs (Artificial Intelligence Bill of Materials) – is already underway.
In practical terms, security teams need to adapt quickly to the changing landscape. Producing accurate SBOMs is just the first step; organizations must also integrate this information into their existing risk management and vulnerability assessment processes. Furthermore, they should prioritize understanding the specific vulnerabilities within their environments, rather than simply relying on generic vendor advisories.
Ultimately, for security teams, the key takeaway is that software transparency is not just a compliance exercise – it’s an operational necessity in today’s complex cybersecurity landscape.
Source: SecurityWeek — 2026-11-10