OT Cyberattacks Leave Defenders in the Dark – How Deception Can Help
The harsh reality of operational technology (OT) cyberattacks is that defenders often find themselves without crucial data, no clear trail to follow, and a dearth of historical evidence. This is particularly true for IT-to-OT attacks, where adversaries first infiltrate enterprise systems before making their way into the OT network. The consequences can be catastrophic, as we saw in Ukraine’s 2015 grid blackout.
The problem lies in the fact that OT environments are not designed to produce useful security telemetry or logs. Unlike traditional IT systems, which provide a wealth of information for investigators to follow, OT networks generate little to no data that can aid in incident response and forensics. This makes it extremely difficult for defenders to reconstruct what happened during an attack.
In a typical IT investigation, security teams would ask questions like: Which user authenticated to the system? Was the login interactive or remote? What process executed? These types of queries are often impossible to answer with confidence in OT environments. Programmable logic controllers (PLCs), remote terminal units (RTUs), and other industrial control systems simply don’t produce meaningful logs or authentication data.
Even when logs do exist, they may be retained locally, overwritten quickly, or unavailable to the security information and event management (SIEM) system. This makes it challenging for defenders relying on signature-based tools to detect attackers, as there is no telemetry to match against. The lack of visibility across the attack path from IT to OT further complicates matters.
Cyber deception has emerged as a powerful tool in addressing these challenges. By creating fake assets, decoy systems, and simulated data, deception defense can provide valuable insights into an attacker’s movements and intentions. In a well-designed deception environment, attackers will be presented with information and devices that mimic real OT assets, allowing defenders to capture forensics and alert them in real-time.
Deception is particularly effective in detecting IT-to-OT attacks, as it provides a cross-domain view of the attack path. By connecting the dots between the attacker’s movements across both IT and OT environments, deception can help defenders identify the most meaningful evidence – even if it doesn’t come from the OT asset itself.
The value of deception lies not only in its ability to provide high-fidelity alerts but also in its capacity to show movement across the critical boundary between IT and OT. By incorporating deception into their security strategies, organizations can gain a better understanding of attacker behavior and improve their chances of detecting and responding to OT cyberattacks.
For defenders of OT systems, it’s essential to recognize that deception is not just a tool for IT environments but also a crucial component in protecting industrial control systems. By embracing deception as part of a comprehensive security strategy, organizations can reduce the risks associated with OT cyberattacks and improve their overall resilience against these types of threats.
Source: Dark Reading — 2026-08-28